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Previous studies have argued that political trust shapes public opinion with respect to 
policies for environmental protection, but this paper provides the first evidence that 
the relationship is causal. The paper presents results from survey experiments 
investigating conditions under which Britons are willing to pay taxes on polluting 
activities. Public willingness to pay increases sharply if new environmental taxes are 
offset by cuts to other kinds of taxes, but political distrust undermines much of the 
effect of this revenue-neutrality. People are also no more willing if revenues are 
hypothecated for spending on environmental protection, while making such taxes 
more tangible to people—by naming petrol and electricity as specific products to 
which they will apply—has a modestly negative effect. 
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Put in the context of the political unpopularity of new taxes, the fact that any major 
environmental taxes have been introduced becomes remarkable, rather than the fact 
there are so few. 
- Mark Pearson, OECD, 1995 
 
 
 Natural scientists have no doubt that pollution and resource use by humans is 
transforming the earth in ways that are fundamentally unsustainable (Rockström et al. 
2009; Stern 2013). This is all the more tragic given that many such transformations 
are unnecessary: policy experts point to effective, low-cost solutions (e.g., Tietenberg 
2013). Above all, mainstream environmental economics recommends that 
governments attach a price to polluting activities, in order to discourage polluters 
from imposing (externalising) the costs of their polluting activities onto others (e.g., 
Parry, Norregaard, and Heine 2012). Correcting the price a polluter must pay to 
engage in a polluting activity using a tax or obligation to surrender a tradable 
emission permit should be a cost-effective means of protecting the environment and 
maximising social well-being (Mirrlees et al. 2011; Pearce 2002; Rajah and Smith 
1994). In practice, where such market-based mechanisms have been introduced, their 
record has generally been excellent.1 
Yet they are not actually being introduced very much. The environmental tax 
share of all public revenues in the European Union barely changed between 2006 and 																																																								
1 The U.S. SO2 trading scheme and British Columbia’s carbon tax are two examples of 
market-based measures for environmental protection that have proven extremely effective 
(Elgie and McClay 2013; Schmalensee and Stavins 2013). The European Union’s Emissions 
Trading System is sometimes held up as evidence of ineffectiveness, but that scheme’s failure 
to attach a meaningful price to greenhouse gas emissions was due to the unanticipated 
economic contraction of recent years, and the resulting surplus of allowances (Sandbag 2012). 
Overall the EU has been achieving substantial greenhouse gas emission reductions (European 
Environment Agency 2015). 
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2013 (Eurostat 2015), for example, and has generally been falling since the mid-1990s 
(Stamatova and Steurer 2013). In the UK specifically, revenue from environmental 
taxes peaked as a share of all total taxes and social contributions in 1998, and has 
changed little since 2001 (Office for National Statistics 2015). Given the growing 
scientific consensus about the seriousness of many environmental problems, and the 
slowly expanding evidence base validating the effectiveness of market-based 
instruments for environmental protection, why are governments making so little use 
of them? 
One major reason is public scepticism, if not outright hostility. Public 
opposition to new environmental taxes has been the norm, and has killed efforts to 
introduce market-based mechanisms in places such as Australia (Baird 2014), Canada 
(Harrison 2012), and Switzerland (Maclucas 2015; Thalmann 2004).2 We therefore 
need to know more about the sources of public opinion with respect to environmental 
protection generally, and how to present problems and solutions such that public 
opinion will allow states to take action (Keohane 2015: 24; see also Jagers and 
Hammar 2009). This paper aims to expand our understanding of conditions under 
which people are less hostile, and more open, to proposals for environmental 
protection using the market-based mechanism that is environmental taxation. The 
results in the paper should be of interest not only to scholars of environmental politics 
and public opinion, but also to policymakers and advocates seeking to foster public 
support. Methodologically, in using experimental evidence about the sources of public 
support for and opposition to market-based measures for environmental protection, 
the paper stands in contrast to most existing literature, which has relied on analyses of 																																																								
2 Some governmental reluctance to engage in better environmental protection is clearly due to 
lobbying by firms with an interest in externalizing their environmental costs (Farrell 2015); 
yet businesses are also sometimes open to the introduction of new environmental policies (see 
e.g., Pulver 2007; Vogel 2000). 
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observational data and has therefore been more vulnerable to the risk of omitted 
variable bias. 
 The headline result of the experiments presented here is that offsetting new 
green taxes with cuts to other kinds of taxes substantially increases public support, but 
framing revenue neutrality as merely a government promise rather than a fact 
substantially undermines the positive effects of offsetting.3 Stating that the new green 
tax revenues are to be spent on the environment has no impact on support. Making the 
increased taxation more real to people by pointing out that it would apply to goods 
and services they purchase also has no effect, unless reference is made to the taxation 
of petrol and electricity, in which case support declines. 
 The substantial impact of framing revenue-neutrality as a promise rather than 
a fact represents the strongest evidence yet that political distrust is an important 
reason for people’s scepticism of market-based measures for environmental 
protection. Green tax increases are typically implemented in tandem with offsetting 
tax reductions elsewhere (Tietenberg 2013), often with the objective of winning 
public acceptance, and the results here validate that revenue neutrality should indeed 
be a powerful means of building support. But majorities of citizens in all countries 
appear not to believe that politicians keep their promises (Naurin 2011), and there is 
clearly widespread scepticism that revenue-neutrality will materialise in practice. As 
such, convincing the public to trust that governments will keep their promises on 
revenue-neutrality is a key challenge for environmental policymakers and advocates; 
seemingly, until voters are convinced, they will remain hostile. 
 
																																																								
3 This paper uses “green taxes” and “environmental taxes” interchangeably. 
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Background/Context 
The European Union defines environmental taxes as those “whose base is a 
physical unit (for example, a litre of petrol or a passenger flight) that has a proven 
negative impact on the environment” (ONS 2015). By this definition, environmental 
taxes in the UK summed to £44.6 billion in 2014, representing 7.5% of all public 
revenue from taxes and social contributions, with households paying an average of 
£765 each for environmental taxes in 2012 (ibid.).4 Britain is fairly typical in the 
OECD in terms of the environmental tax share of all public revenues (see Parry, 
Norregaard, and Heine 2012: 103, citing data from OECD 2010). 
What would it take to increase this share? Politically, there is a measure of 
public “support, consensus, or even merely passive tolerance that is essential to the 
introduction of any new, large-scale tax,” including an environmental tax (Pearson 
1995: 358). Though the rationale for taxing environmental externalities was first 
articulated in the early 20th century (Sandmo 2015), environmental taxes have only 
really been implemented in more than trivial ways since the 1980s. Public opinion has 
not been supportive, however, and has not encouraged policymakers to put in place 
more such measures. Taxes remain an unpopular way of addressing environmental 
problems, even if they are a relatively popular kind of tax (Jagers and Hammar 2009). 
Environmental taxes are unpopular because all taxes are unpopular (Chartered 
Institute of Taxation (2009, cited in Smith 2009). 
There is a rapidly expanding research literature on environmental attitudes 
generally. A number of works in sociology, for example, have addressed the 
demographic correlates of environmental concern, defined as “concern about 
environmental problems and support for environmental protection” (Dunlap and York 																																																								
4 Such taxes include the UK’s climate change levy, aggregates levy, landfill tax, EU 
emissions trading scheme, carbon reduction commitment, and carbon price floor (ONS 2015). 
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2008). Such studies have focused largely on the importance of income (at both the 
national and individual/household levels), as well as underlying general values (e.g., 
Fairbrother 2013; Franzen and Vogl 2013; Shwom, Bidwell, Dan, and Dietz 2010). 
Beyond the demographic characteristics of individuals that correlate with different 
kinds of environmental attitudes, though, we still know little about the substance of 
the beliefs that lead people to hold the attitudes and preferences they do. 
This article addresses support for market-based environmental protection 
mechanisms, building on a number of prior studies that have made good use of 
questions about taxation. Survey questions about a respondent’s “willingness” to pay 
taxes admittedly leave somewhat implicit the scenario in question, but most 
respondents would seem likely to understand that the question is about a potential tax 
policy change, not about whether the respondent will choose individually to cheat on 
his/her taxes. As such, this is a different issue than tax compliance (on which see for 
example Bodea and LeBas 2014; Marien and Hooghe 2011). Questions about taxation 
are also useful insofar as they interrogate people’s valuation of environmental 
protection at some cost (Cao, Milner, Prakash, and Ward 2014: 302). In the absence 
of any trade-off, supporting environmental protection seems a given. What is more 
useful, then, is understanding whether people support it strongly enough to pay a 
price, which tells us something about the strength of their commitment. 
Setting aside relatively fixed demographic characteristics of individuals, what 
we currently know about the conditions under which people are more supportive of 
environmental taxes comes largely from public opinion polls little connected to the 
academic research literature. Probably the most extensive previous investigation of 
public attitudes towards environmental taxes was conducted by a self-styled “Green 
Fiscal Commission” (GFC) in Britain in late 2000s, which paid for a series of surveys 
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on the issue. The discussion that follows makes substantial use of the results of that 
work. 
In the remainder of this section, I derive five hypotheses based on what 
literature there is on attitudes towards environmental taxes. 
First, the Green Fiscal Commission (2007) found stronger support for green 
tax increases accompanied by offsetting reductions to other taxes. One study using 
data on Americans, similarly, found that support for a carbon tax specifically rose 
when it was tied to offsetting reductions in income tax (Ansolabehere and Konisky 
2014). But questions remain about the robustness of this relationship, particularly as 
many people may not understand how a revenue-neutral tax shift could be beneficial 
for the environment. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Offsetting environmental tax increases with tax cuts elsewhere will 
increase willingness to pay. 
 
A “Green Tax Report” by the Chartered Institute of Taxation (2009, cited in 
Smith 2009) argues that hypothecation of revenues for spending on environmental 
protection should increase public support for green taxes. Similarly, specifically with 
respect to projects for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the Green Fiscal 
Commission found greater support if taxes were hypothecated.5 And the House of 
Commons Environmental Audit Committee (2011) says that “even partially 																																																								
5 In one survey in 2007, the Green Fiscal Commission asked a nationally representative 
sample of respondents: “In principle, do you think you would support or oppose green taxes?” 
51% reported support, and 32% opposition. They then asked: “What if there was a guarantee 
that the money generated by the extra tax was spent directly on projects that would help to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions—for example, the money could be used to subsidise public 
transport or home insulation. In principle, would you support or oppose an increase in green 
taxes if the money was spent in this way?” 73% reported support, and only 17% opposition. 
So telling people that the tax revenue would be dedicated to spending on the environment 
increased support for the new taxes. 
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hypothecating revenues from environmental taxes for environmental ends can also 
help to build greater acceptance.” In the case of an energy tax change in Germany, for 
instance, some members of the public “demanded that energy taxes be used to 
promote energy savings and subsidize public transport” (Kohlhaus and Meyer 2005: 
141, quoted in Harrison 2010: 519-20). In short, people may feel environmental 
taxation is more legitimate if the associated revenues are spent on the environment. 
That may be because they do not understand how a tax can be environmentally 
beneficial (through its incentive effects)—thinking rather that spending is the key to 
environmental protection. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Hypothecating the revenues from increased environmental taxes for 
spending on environmental protection will increase willingness to pay. 
 
Another reason people may be hostile to proposals for new environmental 
taxes is that they do not trust that governments will implement them fairly, and as 
they promise to do—such as in tandem with offsetting cuts to other taxes. As the 
Chartered Institute of Taxation (quoted in Smith, 2009) notes, “people do not trust 
governments to implement the environmental taxes in a fiscally neutral way.” Instead, 
people regard taxes on energy for example as “stealth taxes”: an Ipsos MORI poll in 
2008 found for example that 59% of Britons agreed that “climate change is being used 
by the Government as an excuse to raise taxes” (Ipsos MORI 2010: 67). And Harrison 
(2012: 393) notes that even in the case of British Columbia—where a carbon tax has 
proven politically sustainable—“voters simply did not believe the government’s 
reassurances that the tax was revenue neutral” (see also Shwom, Bidwell, Dan, and 
Dietz 2010: 480). Survey data analyses point to trust, including political trust, as a 
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significant correlate of support for action on environmental issues generally (e.g., 
Franzen and Vogl 2013; Meyer and Liebe 2010). Trust has long been linked to 
collective action, and environmental protection is inherently an effort to resolve a 
collective action problem (Duit 2010). 
Two possibilities, then, are that respondents could distrust that governments 
will fulfil their promises to make new green taxes revenue-neutral and/or to use the 
revenues they generate specifically for spending on environmental protection. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Framing the dedication of revenues from environmental taxes to 
spending on environmental protection as a government promise will reduce 
willingness to pay relative to framing it as a fact. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Framing revenue-neutral offsetting as a government promise will 
reduce willingness to pay relative to framing it as a fact. 
 
Another informal finding from existing research is that people “externalise 
responsibility” a great deal (e.g., Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Coleb, and Whitmarsh 2007). 
That is, they do not regard themselves as “polluters” and avoid confronting their own 
contributions to environmental problems, blaming corporations and governments (or 
even just other ordinary people) for such problems instead. As such, “most people … 
do not accept that the main responsibility for taking action against climate change lies 
with individuals and families” (Gough 2011). It may then be the case that respondents 
respond more hostilely to proposals for environmental taxation the more they are 
confronted with suggestions that their own lifestyles have environmental costs. 
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Hypothesis 4: Drawing people’s attention to the fact that environmental tax increases 
will apply to their consumption and spending will reduce willingness to pay. 
 
 Lastly, some previous studies have suggested that support for environmental 
taxes is particularly low where the tax will apply specifically to domestic energy and 
vehicle fuels (Green Fiscal Commission 2009; Hsu 2010; Jagers and Hammar 2009). 
Similarly, Shwom, Bidwell, Dan, and Dietz (2010) note that taxes on petrol have been 
the least popular policy measure, by far, in the two U.S. states they consider. In the 
case of the UK, the taxation of energy specifically is quite heavy (second highest in 
the EU), with most of the tax burden falling on households (Stamatova and Steurer 
2012).6 Yet transport fuels and home energy are generally quite polluting, and so are 
likely candidates for environmental taxation. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Drawing people’s attention to the fact that environmental tax increases 
will apply to their consumption specifically of petrol and electricity, two products to 
whose prices people seem particularly sensitive, will reduce willingness to pay. 
 
Methods 
Social scientists are making growing use of survey experiments to understand 
the public’s attitudes towards environmental degradation and protection (e.g., 
Bernauer and Gampfer 2013; Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Tingley and Tomz 2014). No 
such experiments, however, have investigated the impacts of political trust, and few 
																																																								
6 Mirrlees et al. (2012: 669) note that: “taxation of gasoline and diesel is the most substantial 
excise tax in the United Kingdom, accounting for 5 percent of all tax revenue.” 
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have addressed conditions under which people are willing to pay to pollute (for one 
very recent example see Kaplowitz and McCright 2015). 
I designed an experiment in which each respondent to a nationally 
representative survey received one of several different versions of a commonly used 
opinion question about support for environmental protection. The question 
specifically investigated support for environmental protection in the form of taxation, 
the base version reading: “How willing would you be to pay higher taxes in order to 
protect the environment? Not at all willing, not very willing, fairly willing, or very 
willing?” The International Social Survey Programme has previously used this 
question, across multiple waves, and another question somewhat like it has also been 
included in the World Values Surveys/European Values Studies.7 
Respondents were randomly assigned to five treatments in ten different 
combinations—see Table 1 below (and also Appendix A, for the complete wordings 
of the ten different versions of the question). The five experiments running 
simultaneously investigated the impact on people’s responses of: 
1. Stating that new environmental taxes would be offset by cuts to other taxes. 
(According to hypothesis 1, offsetting should increase support.) 
2. Stating that new revenues from environmental taxes would be spent on 
(unspecified) programmes for environmental protection. (According to 
hypothesis 2, hypothecating should increase support.) 
3. Drawing respondents’ attention to the possibility of the government not doing 
what it says, in having only “promised” to spend the tax revenue on the 
environment and offset the new taxes. (According to hypothesis 3a, only 																																																								
7 The wording in the ISSP was very slightly different: “How willing would you be to pay 
much higher taxes in order to protect the environment?” The WVS/EVS question was: “I 
would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental 
pollution.” 
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promising hypothecation should reduce support compared to it being a fact. 
According to hypothesis 3b, only promising to offset new taxes should reduce 
support compared to it being a fact.) 
4. Emphasising that respondents themselves contribute to pollution, through their 
consumption, with the implication that new environmental taxes would affect 
the cost of things they buy. (According to Hypothesis 4, making 
environmental taxes more concrete should reduce support.) 
5. Pointing out two specific products to which new environmental taxes would 
apply (petrol and electricity), and suggesting the prices of these already 
heavily taxed products would rise. (According to Hypothesis 5, taxing petrol 
and electricity specifically should reduce support.) 
 
The experiment was conducted as part of the UK Understanding Society 
Innovation Panel (IP), a longitudinal survey representative of households in Britain 
(excluding Northern Ireland and north of the Caledonian Canal). The first wave of the 
Innovation Panel ran in 2008, and since then participants have been re-interviewed 
annually. The sample for the seventh, 2014, wave (IP7) consisted of households from 
the original 2008 sample as well as from refreshment samples added in 2011 and 
2014. The data can be obtained from the UK Data Service.8 IP7 generated interviews 
with 2413 individual respondents, 2236 of whom provided valid responses to one of 
																																																								
8 Each wave of the IP entails both a household interview (conducted with one member of the 
household) and separate individual interviews with every member of the household (covering 
topics such as demographics, religion, health, employment, education, and politics). The 
household bill-payer or his/her spouse/partner (or another appropriate person) completes the 
household questionnaire, which includes an enumeration of all household members. Only 
household members aged 16 and over are interviewed in full, and received the environmental 
taxation experiment. 
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the ten questions about environmental taxes.9 The allocation into treatment groups 
was done at the household level, so all eligible adults in a household received the 
same treatment/question.10 
The analyses below also take advantage of other data collected as part of the 
Innovation Panel. In particular, I investigate relationships with a number of key 
demographic and/or non-experimentally manipulated attitudinal variables. How do 
the effects of the randomly assigned treatments vary by people’s background 
characteristics? 
I measure people’s belief in climate change with an index comprising two 
questions about the past and the future: 
• “As far as you know, would you say that average temperatures around the 
world have been higher in the last three years than before that, lower, or 
about the same?” (AVTEMP) 
• “Do you believe that people in the UK will be affected by climate change 
in the next 30 years?” (OPECL30) 
I take a response of “higher” to AVTEMP as stronger belief in climate change (since 
the scientific community agrees that the planet has been warming—see e.g., 
																																																								
9 There were 101 don’t knows, refusals, and missing. For 76 respondents, another household 
member provided information about the respondent, rather than the respondent him/herself; 
these proxy interviews are excluded from the analyses. Of the 2337 non-proxy interviews, 
1581 were conducted face-to-face, 4 by telephone, and 752 online. The 2413 respondents 
were members of 1427 different households; in a total of 58 households, 87 respondents 
completed the individual questionnaire, but nobody completed the household questionnaire, 
such that some household-level variables are missing. There were 657 households with a 
single respondent to the individual questionnaire, 612 with two, 112 with three, 35 with four, 
ten with five, and one with six. 
10 The IP is specifically focused on experimental tests of survey procedures and the content of 
the questionnaire. Brief descriptions of all the IP7 methodological experiments and their 
results are available from: www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/research/publications/working-
paper/understanding-society/2015-03.pdf. Further methodological details are available at 
www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/d/204/6849_ip_waves1-7_user_manual_June_2015.pdf and 
www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/d/196/IP7_TechReport_v4.pdf (the latter also including 
information about response rates). 
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Lewandowsky, Risbey, and Oreskes 2015). Goodman-Kruskal’s G (a measure of 
association between two ordinal variables) for this index is	0.60), indicating an 
acceptably strong association between the two items. Disbelief in climate change is 
rare (20%). 
Second, I measure left political ideology with an index comprising the 
questions JOBS and ADQHOUS (G = 0.45): 
• “Do you think the government should or should not see to it that every 
person has a job and a good standard of living?” 
• “Some people feel the government should see to it that all people have 
adequate housing, while others feel each person should provide for his or 
her own housing. Which comes closest to how you feel about this?” 
Since these two questions address support for the state’s active intervention in 
the economy, I also refer to them as measuring economic liberalism (in the European 
rather than American sense). This variable’s usefulness as a measure of left political 
ideology is demonstrated by its capturing meaningful partisan differences: its mean 
score for Conservative party sympathisers is 0.45, 0.64 for Liberal Democrats, and 
0.77 for Labour.11 Left ideology is prevalent by this measure—almost half of 
Conservatives subscribe to it—and it maps on well to the parties’ relative placements 
on an overall left-right index, judging by their platforms.12 
Third, background political distrust, or cynicism, is measured as an index 
comprising answers to two questions (G = 0.52): 
																																																								
11 I do not examine party identification further in the analyses below because it is missing for 
a large number of respondents. 
12 See the Manifesto Project of Volkens et al. (2015), who scored Labour -1.50, the LibDems 
4.66, and the Conservatives 17.54 in 2010 (http://manifesto-project.wzb.eu). 
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• “Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are 
corrupt, not very many are, hardly any of them are corrupt, or do you not 
have an opinion?” (DCRKD) 
• “Do you feel that almost all of the people running the government are 
smart people, or do you think that quite a few of them don’t seem to know 
what they are doing, or do you not have an opinion on that?” (LDSMRT, 
reverse-coded) 
Distrust by these measures is widespread, with a mean score of 0.71—consistent for 
example with an Ipsos MORI poll of British adults in 2009 that found only 13% 
generally trusted politicians to tell the truth, the lowest proportion out of 16 types of 
people (Ipsos MORI 2010). Neither question refers explicitly to trust, but other 
studies have found strong relationships between political trust and perceptions of 
politicians’ corruption and competence (Van Der Meer and Dekker 2011; Morris and 
Klesner 2010). Political distrust is only minimally correlated with political ideology 
(G = 0.09). 
Fourth, interest in politics is captured by VOTE6 (with four ordered response 
options): 
• “How interested would you say you are in politics?”13 
Finally, demographic covariates are education (highest qualification), age in 
years (less the sample minimum of 16), rural as opposed to urban residence, gender 
(female is the reference category), and income (FIHHMNGRS_DV, gross household 
income in the month prior to the interview, divided both by 1000 and by the square 																																																								
13 A number of unrelated experiments affected how these questions were asked. In the cases 
of LDSMRT, LDCRKD, AVTEMP, JOBS, and ADQHOUS, in each case respondents were 
randomly assigned to one of four versions of each question (two for AVTEMP). I ignore the 
distinctions in the analyses below, however. The random assignment to different wordings 
was done separately for each question, and the effects of the differences in wording were not 
large for any of these questions. 
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root of the number of household members). Appendix B presents descriptive statistics 
for all of these attitudinal and demographic variables. 
I present results below in the form of ordinal probit models fitted using the R 
package MCMCglmm (Hadfield 2010). Estimation was Bayesian, with flat priors. 
The probability of observing an outcome in category k is: Pr(y=k) = FN(γk|wθ, σe2) − 
FN(γk+1|wθ, σe2) , where FN is the Normal distribution function, and σe2 is fixed at 1. 
The γ’s are cutpoints (with one γ equal to zero); w consists of fixed and random 
effects design matrices X and Z; and θ comprises vectors of regression coefficients β 
and random intercepts u. Because some households included multiple respondents to 
the individual survey (and all members of each household received the same treatment 
for the experiment), I include a random intercept for households in each model. This 
had the effect of slightly widening the credible intervals for the coefficient estimates. 
Given the Bayesian estimation of the models, instead of frequentist p values, the 
tables with the fitted models below include the modelled probability that the sign of 
each estimated beta coefficient was the opposite of the mean value. (The coefficient 




First, Table 1 presents models of willingness to pay as a function of only 
observational data. These models investigate the demographic and attitudinal 
correlates of being willing to pay taxes to protect the environment. Model 1 includes 
only demographics—education, income, gender, age, and a dummy variable for rural 
rather than urban residence. Model 2 includes those demographics, plus a number of 
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attitudinal covariates: belief in climate change, left ideology (versus economic 
liberalism), political distrust, and interest in politics. 
Table 1: Models with Observational Data Only 
Model 1 2 
Fixed Effects   
Highest qualification:   




































Belief in Climate Change  1.23** 
(0.00) 
Left Ideology   0.13 
(0.08) 
Political Distrust  -0.40** 
(0.00) 






Random Effects (SD)   
Households 0.94 0.77 
Cutpoints   
1 1.02 1.00 
2 2.62 2.55 
Deviance Information Criterion 3793 3775 
N (households, individuals) 1100, 1560 1100, 1560 
Note: Random effects are presented on the standard deviation 
scale. Figures in parentheses are the modelled probabilities of 
the parameter having the opposite sign; coefficients are marked 
with * if the probability is less than 0.05, ** if less than 0.01. 




 Model 1 shows that higher- versus lower-income earners are no different in 
their willingness, and nor are rural versus urban residents, or older rather than 
younger Britons. But men and women, and even more so education groups, differ 
significantly: women are more willing to pay to protect the environment, and so are 
more educated people. 
Adding attitudinal covariates makes little differences to these demographic 
relationships. Model 2 shows that, not surprisingly, respondents who believe in 
climate change are more willing to pay taxes. The politically distrustful are less 
willing, and those with left political ideologies are more so. Ceteris paribus, those 
more interested in politics are also more willing. These results are consistent with 
prior empirical research discussed earlier. 
 
Table 2: Raw Percentages of Each Response, by Combination of Conditions 
 

















































A      29.1 32.9 32.9 5.1 
B X     6.8 18.6 44.3 30.3 
C  X    24.7 35.9 35.4 4.0 
D X X    13.5 20.7 43.7 22.1 
E  X X   27.1 29.4 37.4 6.1 
F X X X   22.8 24.2 38.4 14.6 
G    X  25.2 30.3 38.7 5.9 
H X   X  9.6 16.1 44.0 30.3 
I    X X 27.7 43.8 25.1 3.4 
J X   X X 16.0 20.3 42.6 21.1 
Raw percentages of respondents giving each answer, depending on the combination 
of treatments they were assigned. 
* effect statistically significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
† effect statistically significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed), in interaction with Offset 
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Next, Table 2 presents the results of the five experiments, in the form of the 
raw percentages of respondents who provided each of the four possible answers, 
under ten different combinations of the five experimental conditions. Table 2 shows 
that, among respondents who received the base version of the question (A), about a 
third provided each of the three less supportive responses, and only a small number 
(5.1%) gave the most supportive response (“very willing”). The distribution of 
responses varied substantially across the other nine scenarios, indicating that 
differences in question wording made a meaningful difference. 
Table 3 presents the results of the experiments as analysed using multilevel 
models (such models being appropriate given the nesting of respondents within 
households). The first model in Table 3, with only dummies for the various 
experimental treatments on the right-hand side, presents the core findings of this 
paper.14 First, revenue-neutrality is a strong means of increasing acceptance of 
environmental taxes: the coefficient on Offset is large. People are much more willing 
to pay if new environmental taxes are offset with tax cuts elsewhere. Hypothesis 1 is 
therefore supported. 
Second, and somewhat surprisingly, the evidence here suggests people are not 
more enthusiastic if green tax revenue is “Spent” on the environment. If anything, 
people are somewhat less willing to pay new environmental taxes, if told that the 
revenues will also be spent specifically on programmes for environmental protection. 




14 Appendix C presents a model with each of nine treatment conditions entered simply as a 
dummy variables relative to the base category A. 
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Table 3: Models including Randomly Assigned Treatments 
Model 3 4 5 6 7 





























































Belief in Climate Change  1.69** 
(0.00)    
Left Ideology   0.37* (0.02)   
Political Distrust    -0.64** (0.01)  
Interest in Politics     0.28** (0.00) 




























































Random Effect Variance      
Households 0.64 0.58 0.67 0.75 0.60 
Cutpoints      
1 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.96 
2 2.42 2.47 2.47 2.50 2.43 
Deviance Information 
Criterion 5473 5015 5128 4236 5458 









Note: Random effects are presented on the standard deviation scale. Figures in 
parentheses are the modelled probabilities of the parameter having the opposite sign; 
coefficients are marked with * if the probability is less than 0.05, ** if less than 0.01. 
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Third, there is clear evidence that many people distrust government promises. 
The coefficient on “Promise” is not statistically significant by itself, but that is 
because (as per the previous paragraph) people appear not to value spending revenues 
from green taxes on the environment. They therefore are not concerned about the risk 
of governments failing to follow through on promises to do so. Hypothesis 3a is not 
supported. People do, however, clearly care about revenue neutrality. Where the 
government’s promise is not only to spend revenues on the environment, but also to 
offset new green taxes, then people have reason to worry about the risk of promised 
outcomes never materialising. The coefficient on the interaction effect “Offset : 
Promised”, capturing how the effect of Offset changes if it is a government promise 
rather than a fait accompli, is therefore negative and significant. Hypothesis 3b is 
therefore supported. While fiscal neutrality makes environmental protection much 
more appealing to the public, political distrust appears to reduce the positive effects of 
framing new environmental taxes as fiscally neutral. Considering the relatively minor 
difference in the wording between versions D and F, the magnitude of the impact on 
the responses is surprisingly large.15 
Fourth, making the possibility of increased taxation more concrete to 
respondents, and framing respondents themselves as polluters, makes no significant 
difference. Hypothesis 4 is therefore not supported. 
Fifth, however, specifically naming petrol and electricity as goods that would 
be subject to the hypothetical new tax substantially undermines support. Hypothesis 5 
is therefore supported. 
																																																								
15 Note that D and F describe scenarios where taxes—and thus public revenues—stay the 
same, but spending increases. The result by implication will be a net public deficit. 
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Models 4 through 7 in Table 3 are similar to Model 3, except that each one 
includes a series of interaction effects. In each case, an attitudinal covariate is 
interacted with each of the randomly assigned treatments. For each model, then, the 
first six rows show the effect of the treatment on the base category: people who do not 
believe in climate change, who subscribe to economically liberal ideology, who are 
politically trusting, and who are uninterested in politics, respectively. The next 
coefficient, in each model, indicates the difference between people holding the 
alternative and reference values for the attitudinal covariate in question. Then the next 
six coefficients capture the difference between the randomly assigned treatment’s 
effect on people with the alternative and reference values for each of those same 
attitudinal covariates. 
 As in Table 2 above, belief in climate change, subscribing to left/anti-liberal 
political ideology, being politically trusting, and being interested in politics all predict 
more willingness to pay. But the effects of the various treatments do not differ much 
across these different types of people, even if they are quite different in their views. In 
Model 6, the probability that the effect of Offset : Promised is negative is less than 
95%, unlike in the other Models, but the magnitude of the interaction effect is not 
actually much different. That it is smaller, however, reflects logically that the 
politically trusting—measured by the questions about politicians’ competence and 
corruptness—are less sceptical of politicians’ promises than the politically distrusting. 
Much the same is shown by the negative sign of the triple interaction effect in Model 
6 (Distrust : Offset : Promised). Only for the politically distrustful is this interaction 
effect negative; these people are therefore the most affected by the knowledge that 
revenue-neutrality is a promise rather than a fact. 
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Since interpreting interaction effects is challenging, and to provide the a sense 
of the magnitudes of the effects, Figure 1 presents the expected proportions of 
responses by different categories of people under different randomly assigned 
scenarios. The five categories of people presented are: Britons as a whole (the whole 
sample), climate sceptics, economic liberals, the politically distrustful, and the 
politically uninterested. The expected proportions are derived from the five models 
appearing in Table 3, in order. Darker shades of green represent greater willingness to 
pay higher environmental taxes. 
Comparing different groups of people in the base scenario (A), clearly climate 
sceptics are most hostile to proposals for new environmental taxes, with almost three-
quarters unwilling to pay for new green taxes. Notably, however, in the most positive 
scenario (H), only about half of climate sceptics are not at all or not very willing—a 
substantial change. And climate sceptics are a very small minority; responses to the 
two questions about climate change are both very skewed to the upper end of the scale 
(see Appendix B). The other groups are more similar, with economic liberals the least 
distinct from the general population, suggesting that in Britain there is no great 
political divide with respect to willingness to pay new environmental taxes. In many 
of Figure 1’s panels, the politically uninterested are more distinct than economic 
liberals. 
The scenarios in the bottom row of Figure 1 represent those where new 
environmental taxes are offset by tax reductions elsewhere, and the responses to these 
scenarios are all more enthusiastic than those in the upper row; the bottom row is 
greener. But the column where the two rows differ the least is the middle one 
(scenarios E and F)—where spending revenues on the environment and providing 
offsetting cuts to other taxes are only government promises, rather than a fact. 
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Comparing scenario F to scenario D, it is clear that the added greenness generated by 
Offsetting is substantially mitigated. That is, adding “Offset” (moving from scenario 
C to D, or A to B) can make a substantial difference, but adding “Offset” in the 
presence of “Promised” (moving from E to F) makes little difference. Given the 
marked differences between the responses from people assigned to scenario F as 
opposed to D, and the fact that the only difference between these two scenarios is 
whether revenue-neutrality is a government promise rather than a fact, many people 
clearly do not regard government promises as credible. The results of this 
experimental treatment therefore demonstrate the effect of political distrust. 
 
Figure 1: Modelled Probabilities of Providing Each Response, by Combination 
of Conditions 
 
Note: Expected proportions of respondents providing each of the four possible 
responses, under ten different scenarios, derived from the five models appearing in 

































































































































































































not at all willing
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Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The survey experiments described in this article suggest reasons why the 
public is so often hostile to what policy experts generally consider the most effective 
means of protecting the natural environment. Consistent with results from qualitative 
focus groups, the public’s hostility to environmental taxation appears to be due in 
large part to political distrust. People do not believe the government will follow 
through on promises to offset new environmental taxes with cuts to other taxes (Green 
Fiscal Commission 2009; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, and Whitmarsh 2007). Even in 
positive cases elsewhere, where a substantial new environmental tax has proven 
politically sustainable and the public has been accepting, there has been substantial 
scepticism about revenue neutrality. (See for example the case of British Columbia—
Harrison 2012; Lachapelle, Borick, and Rabe 2012.) 
Further research would benefit from exploring how the relationship between 
political trust and willingness to pay environmental taxes may differ across different 
kinds of political/cultural contexts—such as low rather than high-trust societies. 
Britain is middling in this regard, among high-income nations. Especially given the 
hugely U.S.-focused character of the literature, we need more systematic comparisons 
of cross-national differences. More broadly, we also need to know more about the 
effects of different kinds of framing, and how such framing relates to attitudes 
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a. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes in order to protect the 
environment? 
b. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes in order to protect the 
environment, if the government reduced other taxes you pay by the same 
amount? 
c. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes, if the government spent the 
extra money on protecting the environment? 
d. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes, if the government spent the 
extra money on protecting the environment and reduced other taxes you pay 
by the same amount? 
e. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes, if the government promised it 
would spend the extra money on protecting the environment? 
f. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes, if the government promised it 
would spend the extra money on protecting the environment and reduce other 
taxes you pay by the same amount? 
g. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes on things you buy that pollute 
the environment? 
h. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes on things you buy that pollute 
the environment, if the government reduced other taxes you pay by the same 
amount? 
i. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes on things you buy that pollute 
the environment, like petrol or electricity? 
j. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes on things you buy that pollute 
the environment, like petrol or electricity, if the government reduced other 




Table B1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Min Max Unique Valid SD 
Age (years-16) 34.21 0 80 80 2413 18.17 
Education       
Degree (reference) 0.25 0 1 2 2400 0.43 
Other higher degree 0.14 0 1 2 2400 0.34 
A-level etc. 0.22 0 1 2 2400 0.41 
GCSE etc. 0.24 0 1 2 2400 0.43 
Other qualification 0.07 0 1 2 2400 0.26 
No qualification 0.08 0 1 2 2400 0.28 
Income 2.20 0 16.67 1356 2326 1.31 
Male 0.46 0 1 2 2413 0.50 
Rural 0.23 0 1 2 2413 0.42 
Political Distrust 0.71 0 1 5 1788 0.32 
LDSMRT 0.24 0 1 2 1988 0.43 
DCRKD 1.30 0 2 3 1953 0.73 
Belief in Climate Change 0.80 0 1 5 2141 0.26 
G_OPECL30 0.85 0 1 2 2231 0.36 
GW 1.48 0 2 3 2231 0.61 
Left Ideology 0.63 0 1 3 2166 0.38 
ADQHOUS 0.66 0 1 2 2190 0.47 
JOBS 0.60 0 1 2 2220 0.49 




Table C1: Model with Treatment Dummies 


























Deviance Information Criterion 5493 
N (households, individuals) 1427, 2413 
Note: Random effects are presented on the 
standard deviation scale. Figures in parentheses 
are the modelled probabilities of the parameter 
having the opposite sign; coefficients are 
marked with * if the probability is less than 





Figure D1: Modelled Probabilities of Providing Each Response, by Scenario 
 
Note: Expected proportions of respondents providing each of the four possible 
responses, according to the model in Appendix C. The vertical bars represent 95% 
Bayesian credible intervals. 
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